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QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether traditional equal protection “rational 
basis” analysis under Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 
528 U.S. 562 (2000), applies to public employers who 
intentionally treat similarly situated employees 
differently with no rational bases for arbitrary, 
vindictive or malicious reasons. 
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OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the Ninth Circuit (Pet. 12a-69a) is 
reported at 478 F.3d 985.1  The April 8, 2004 opinion 
of the District Court, granting in part and denying in 
part Respondents’ summary judgment motion (JA 
13), is available at 2004 WL 792790.  The September 
14, 2004 opinion of the District Court, denying 
Respondents’ second summary judgment motion 
judgment (JA 49), is available at 2004 WL 2066748. 
The judgment of the District Court (Pet. 8a-11a) is 
not reported.2
JURISDICTION 
The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for 
rehearing and rehearing en banc on July 12, 2007.  
Pet. 70a-71a.  The certiorari petition was timely filed 
on October 5, 2007.  This Court has jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent 
part: 
[N]or shall any state . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
                                                
1 The Ninth Circuit dismissed the Oregon Department of 
Agriculture from the appeal. “Respondents” herein refers to 
Joseph Hyatt and John Szczepanski, unless otherwise indicated. 
2 “ER” is Respondents’ Excerpts of Record in the Ninth 
Circuit.  “SER” is Petitioner’s Supplemental Excerpts of Record 
in the Ninth Circuit.  
2
STATEMENT 
A. 
B. 
                                               
Overview 
Petitioner Anup Engquist worked at the Oregon 
Department of Agriculture.  Her complaint claimed, 
inter alia, that Respondents Joseph Hyatt and John 
Szczepanski caused her to lose her job “for arbitrary, 
vindictive, and malicious reasons in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.”  JA 10, ¶ 26.  This claim 
was made under the class-of-one doctrine.  See, e.g., 
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) 
(per curiam).  Following trial, the jury found that 
Respondents had intentionally treated Engquist 
“differently than others similarly situated . . . without 
any rational basis and solely for arbitrary, vindictive, 
or malicious reasons.”  Pet. 3a-4a.  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed, holding that the Equal Protection Clause 
does not protect classes of one in public employment.  
Id. at 19a-27a. 
Facts 
Anup Engquist is a woman born in India.3  In 
December 1992, she was hired by the Oregon Depart-
ment of Agriculture (“ODA”) to work as an 
international food standards specialist in the Export 
Service Center (“ESC”), a laboratory within ODA’s 
Laboratory Services Division (“LSD”).  Pet. 14a-15a.  
The ESC is one of two laboratories in the LSD, and 
the LSD is one of ten ODA divisions.4 
 
3 The facts set forth are taken from the extensive record of the 
eleven-day jury trial.  
4 Established in 1990, the ESC was initially funded by grants 
with the expectation that it would become self-sustaining, a goal 
it reached in two years. Under Corristan and Engquist, ESC 
was highly successful,  SER 212-13, generating a profit for the 
State in excess of $250,000 in 18 months.  After Corristan and 
3
Engquist was hired by Norma Corristan, the LSD 
administrator and a Mexican-American.  The ESC 
manager reported to Corristan.  Engquist’s job was to 
generate business for the ESC and to consult with the 
ESC’s “customers,” companies that export food 
overseas. Engquist developed an international 
database of food additives, laws, and regulations; 
marketed the ESC’s services, which included testing 
and certifying exported goods and providing consult-
ing services for customers; and created food safety 
training and scientific exchange programs.  ER 131-
34. 
Respondent Joseph Hyatt was hired in 1990 as a 
chemist and made it difficult for Engquist to do her 
job.  He did not communicate with her or give her 
information necessary for her job, and made false, 
derogatory statements about her to others.  SER 163-
64.  Hyatt took it upon himself to monitor her, even 
following her when she went to the ladies room.  Id. 
at 166.  He told other employees she was absent from 
her work location when she was present and that she 
lied on time sheets.  Id.  Hyatt conceded that he made 
false, derogatory statements to others about 
Engquist.  Id. at 254. 
In response, Corristan initiated disciplinary action 
against Hyatt. She required him to attend anger 
management and diversity training programs. 
Corristan testified that Hyatt told her that “it made 
him angry to have to go.”  SER 194. 
Afterwards, Corristan heard Hyatt comment that 
Engquist did not do anything, did not work, did not 
show up for work, and that whatever she did was 
                                                                                                
Engquist were terminated, ESC’s operation generated a loss to 
the State in excess of $662,000.  SER 155-57.   
4
insignificant—all claims Corristan believed were 
false.  SER 195-96. 
In December 1999, when the incumbent ESC 
manager left, Hyatt asked Corristan to promote him 
to that position. Corristan refused on the ground that 
he was unready to be a manager.  SER 197.  Denied 
promotion to be ESC manager a second time, Hyatt 
transferred from the LSD to the Administrative 
Services Division to work as a systems analyst in 
Information Services.  Hyatt continued to work in the 
same building as Engquist, and to torment her.  
Respondent John Szczepanski became ODA’s 
Assistant Director in 2001, and oversaw the LSD.  
Pet. 15a.  At the time, about thirty employees worked 
in the LSD, including about thirteen in the ESC.  
Trial Tr. Vol. 5, 15:6-10; id. at 16:23-17:2. 
In June 2001, Szczepanski removed the ESC from 
Corristan’s supervision and assumed control of the 
laboratory. Szczepanski contemporaneously told a 
customer that Corristan and Engquist “would be 
gotten rid of.”  SER 181-82.  In September 2001, 
Hyatt told a coworker that Szczepanski had asked 
him to prepare a personnel plan and that the two of 
them were working on “getting rid of Norma and 
Anup.”  Id. at 188-89.  Hyatt said the plan was 
confidential because he did not know whom to trust.  
Id. 
Hyatt then sent Szczepanski an email urging him 
to sharply limit Corristan’s and Engquist’s duties.  
He told Szczepanski to remove Corristan from all 
ESC responsibilities and to eliminate Engquist’s 
management responsibilities. Hyatt even wrote a 
“draft letter” for Szczepanski to send to Corristan, 
advising Szczepanski to “put it into your own words.”  
SER 139.  Szczepanski did as Hyatt suggested.  These 
5
communications are remarkable because at the time 
Hyatt did not work for LSD.  Id. at 221-22, 259-60. 
Meanwhile, since December 1999, Corristan, 
Engquist, and one other employee had jointly 
assumed the duties of the departed ESC manager.  
After assuming control of the ESC, Szczepanski 
moved to fill the position.  Hyatt, Engquist, and a 
third employee applied for the position. Szczepanski 
chose Hyatt, ignoring the recommendation of an 
independent expert and deviating from the list of 
official interview questions, effective October 2001.  
Trial Tr. Vol. 6B, 31:15-21; id. at 32:7-13; Trial Tr. 
Vol. 4B, 91:13-92:11; Pls.’ Exs. 30-31. 
Almost immediately upon his appointment, Hyatt 
began curtailing Engquist’s duties, excessively 
monitoring her performance and circulating false 
statements and innuendo to others.  For example, 
Hyatt twice lied, telling a coworker that Enqgust was 
falsifying her time cards.  He sent emails falsely 
implying that Engquist was spending work-time 
doing crossword puzzles, suggesting that she was 
abusing sick leave, and insinuating that she was 
using state resources to start a private business.5  
SER 143-49. 
 Szczepanski and Hyatt ultimately eliminated 
Corristan’s and Engquist’s positions.  Szczepanski 
dismissed Corristan in December 2001 and Engquist 
in February 2002.  They claimed that their actions 
were taken for budgetary reasons, but Engquist 
introduced evidence, which the jury credited, that 
                                                
5 Engquist introduced a mountain of venomous writings and 
emails by Szczepanski and Hyatt expressing their antipathy 
toward her and Corristan.  These statements were made both 
before and after Hyatt's promotion.  A sampling is found at SER 
139-57. 
6
this was not a credible or rational justification for 
dismissing her and Corristan rather than others in 
LSD.  Pursuant to her collective bargaining 
agreement, Engquist was given the opportunity to 
“bump” into another position at her level, but she was 
found unqualified for the only other such position.  
She declined to move to a position below her level.  
In sum, Szczepanski gave Hyatt the promotion that 
Corristan had denied him, and Hyatt and 
Szczepanski terminated both Corristan, who had 
disciplined Hyatt, and Engquist, who had been a 
thorn in Hyatt’s side for years.  Across ODA’s ten 
divisions, Corristan and Engquist were the only full-
time employees who lost their jobs during this period 
(though other employees were subsequently 
dismissed).  Referring by name to Corristan and 
Engquist, Hyatt afterward stated that he “couldn’t 
afford to get rid of any more female minorities 
because he had already gotten rid of two.”  SER 185. 
C. 
                                               
District Court Proceedings 
In December 2002, Engquist filed this action, 
naming as defendants the ODA, Szczepanski, and 
Hyatt, and asserting a number of claims.6  As part of 
her equal protection claim, Engquist alleged that 
Szczepanski and Hyatt had taken adverse 
employment actions against her “for arbitrary, 
 
6 She alleged harassment, discrimination and retaliation 
against ODA based on race, color, sex, and/or national origin in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a).  She further claimed that Hyatt and 
Szczepanski engaged in discrimination based on “race, color, 
sex, national origin, and/or for arbitrary, and malicious reasons” 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. She also set forth 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Due Process Clause, and 
based on the tort of intentional interference with contract.  JA 5-
12. 
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vindictive, and malicious reasons in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.”  JA 10. 
After discovery, Respondents moved for summary 
judgment.  Their motion did not address Engquist’s 
class-of-one claim.  In April 2004, the District Court 
granted Respondents’ motion in part and denied it in 
part.7  
Respondents subsequently filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment on the class-of-one claim.  In 
response, Engquist argued that, among their 
approximately 30 LSD co-workers—whom Engquist 
presented as the relevant comparators for purposes of 
her class-of-one claim—only she and Corristan were 
targeted for elimination for arbitrary, malicious and 
vindictive reasons.  The District Court denied 
Respondents’ motion: 
Under the theory urged by plaintiff, she must 
show that she was singled out as a result of 
animosity on the part of Hyatt and Szczepanski.  
To do so, she must show that their actions were 
spiteful efforts to punish her for reasons 
unrelated to any legitimate state objective.  As 
with any equal protection claim, plaintiff must 
also demonstrate that she was treated differently 
than others who were similarly situated . . . . 
Hyatt was allegedly working on a plan with 
Szczepanski to terminate plaintiff’s position. . . . . 
There is evidence that plaintiff performed her job 
                                                
7 The District Court dismissed that portion of Engquist’s Title 
VII and equal protection claims alleging unlawful harassment. 
As to her § 1981 claim, the court dismissed the portion alleging 
violations based on her gender.  As to her due process claim, the 
court dismissed the portion alleging violations of procedural due 
process. The court denied the remainder of the motion.  JA 13-
48. 
8
satisfactorily and that her termination was not 
the result of “reorganization” or budgetary cuts.  
Based on this same evidence, there are genuine 
issues of fact as to whether plaintiff was singled 
out as a result of animosity on the part of Hyatt 
and Szczepanski, thereby violating her equal 
protection rights.  Accordingly, the court 
concludes that plaintiff’s “class of one” theory 
survives and defendants’ motion is denied. 
JA 58-59 (citations omitted). 
Engquist’s case proceeded to an eleven-day trial.  
At the close of the evidence, the District Court 
instructed the jury:  
To bring a successful Equal Protection claim 
under the “class of one” doctrine, Plaintiff must 
prove that defendants treated her differently 
than others similarly situated.  
 Second, that the different treatment caused the 
denial of Plaintiff’s promotion, the exercise of her 
bumping rights or the termination of her 
employment. 
Third, that no rational basis exists for the 
difference in treatment. 
And fourth, that Defendant took these actions for 
arbitrary, vindictive, or malicious reasons.  
JA 63-64. 
The jury unanimously returned a verdict for 
Engquist on her class-of-one claim.  The jury also 
returned verdicts for Engquist on her substantive due 
process and intentional interference with contract 
9
claims.  Finally, the jury also rejected Respondents’ 
qualified-immunity defense.  Pet. 1a-6a.8 
D. 
                                               
Appeal 
In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed, 
holding that “the class-of-one equal protection theory 
is not applicable to decisions made by public 
employers.”  Pet. 19a. The majority (Tashima and 
Graber, JJ.) began by offering a distinction between
the government acting as a proprietor managing its 
own internal affairs and as a sovereign making and 
applying laws and rules to private parties.  Id. at 23a-
24a.  
After noting limits on public employee rights under 
the First and Fourth Amendments, the majority 
concluded that “[t]he class-of-one theory of equal 
protection is another area of law where the rights of 
public employees should not be as expansive as the 
rights of ordinary citizens.”  Pet. 25a.  The court did 
not reach the other grounds for Respondents’ appeal 
(e.g., the sufficiency of the evidence as to “similarly 
situated” employees, and qualified immunity). 
Judge Reinhardt dissented.  First, he stated that he 
would have adopted the approach of every other 
circuit to consider the issue.  Pet. 60a-61a.  Second, 
he explained why the majority’s failure to allow class-
 
8 Before Engquist’s trial in federal court, Corristan sued 
Respondents in Multnomah County Circuit Court.  In November 
2003, the jury awarded Corristan $1.1 million in damages.  SER 
158.  The jury found for Corristan, inter alia, on her claims that 
Hyatt and Szczepanski violated her equal protection rights 
through different treatment without a rational basis for 
arbitrary, vindictive, or malicious reasons; that Hyatt 
discriminated against Corristan on the basis of gender or 
ethnicity; and that Hyatt intentionally interfered with 
Corristan’s employment. 
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of-one claims in public employment was inconsistent 
with precedent.  Id. at 61a-62a.  Third, he 
demonstrated that the majority’s concern that the 
doctrine would eliminate at-will employment was 
misplaced, explaining that at-will employment did 
not mean that the “government may freely treat its 
employees maliciously and irrationally.”  Id. at 61a-
62a.  Fourth, he showed that the other circuits had 
avoided a flood of litigation by applying principles 
that cabined the application of the claim.  Id. at 65a. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I.  The Equal Protection Clause contains one simple 
command: No state shall “deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).  These 
majestic words mean what they say.  The Clause does 
not limit its mandate to “discrete or insular 
minorities,” “fundamental rights,” or “suspect 
classifications”; it protects “persons.”  This Court has 
recognized this principle from its pronouncement in 
Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879), that the 
Clause “means that no person or class of persons 
shall be denied the same protection,” to its holding in 
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 
(2000) (per curiam), that a violation of the Clause can 
exist if a single “plaintiff alleges that she has been 
intentionally treated differently from others similarly 
situated and that there is no rational basis for the 
difference in treatment.” 
In holding that “the class-of-one theory of equal 
protection is inapplicable to decisions made by public 
employers with regard to their employees,” (Pet. 19a), 
the divided panel below not only ignored the 
Constitution’s plain text and its interpretation by this 
Court, it also jettisoned a cardinal rule of 
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constitutional law.  Instead of tailoring a public 
employee’s constitutional right to fit the context, the 
panel simply decreed that the right did not exist.  The 
panel thereby rejected this Court’s approach to public 
employment, in areas as diverse as free speech, 
search and seizure, and due process.  In each of these 
areas, this Court has been careful to “ensure that 
citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by 
virtue of working for the government.”  Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).  For this reason 
alone, the decision below should be reversed. 
II.  Reversal is appropriate for another reason 
specific to the Equal Protection Clause.  This Court 
has repeatedly held that “strict scrutiny” review is 
appropriate for racial classifications in the public 
employment context.  It has not distinguished 
between the public employment and all other settings 
in the application of strict scrutiny. Yet the Ninth 
Circuit has now held that a central aspect of the 
Equal Protection Clause, rational-basis scrutiny, 
protects only some public employees, some of the 
time.  There are not two Equal Protection Clauses, 
one for the population at large (providing both strict 
scrutiny and rational-basis review) and another for 
public employees (providing only the former).  The 
divided panel below erred in concluding otherwise.    
Under the Constitution’s text and this Court’s 
doctrine, there is nothing unique about equal 
protection claims brought by a small group or a single 
individual, a so-called “class of one.”  If a state 
legislature enacted a law that singled out a public 
employee for unequal treatment without any rational 
basis, that law would violate the Clause despite the 
narrowness of its application and this Court’s trust in 
the democratic process to remedy imprudent 
legislative measures.  If a state actor intentionally 
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singles out a public employee for unequal treatment 
without a rational basis, that decision violates the 
Clause as well.     
III.  In practice, the weighty burden a plaintiff 
must shoulder under rational-basis review effectively 
limits successful class-of-one claims against public 
employers.  In light of the wide range of legitimate 
government objectives in the workplace, public 
employers will usually be able to proffer a rational 
basis for their differential treatment of an employee.   
Nine circuit courts have recognized class-of-one 
claims for public employees.  None has faced the 
“flood of litigation” or the parade of horribles 
imagined by the divided panel below which rewrote 
the Constitution on grounds of policy.   
Instead, these courts of appeals have weeded out 
insubstantial equal protection claims simply by 
following this Court’s time-honored approach.  To 
succeed, a class-of-one plaintiff must establish “that 
she has been intentionally treated differently from 
others similarly situated and that there is no rational 
basis for the difference in treatment.”  Olech, 528 
U.S. at 564.  The Court’s standard places significant 
burdens on a plaintiff.  She must prove that (1) the 
public employer acted intentionally; (2) she was 
treated differently from other similarly situated 
employees; and (3) the difference in treatment was 
not rationally related to any legitimate government 
objective.   
Although Olech does not require that a class-of-one 
plaintiff allege that the unequal treatment he 
received was the result of animus or vindictiveness, 
several courts of appeals have observed that a 
plaintiff may need to establish one of these factors to 
surmount rational basis review.  For example, 
animus may be necessary to show that the 
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government’s unequal treatment was intentional, or 
that the plaintiff was treated differently from 
similarly situated employees, or that the government 
can offer no rational basis for its classification of the 
employee.   
The application of the rational basis test to class-of-
one employment plaintiffs by nine different courts of 
appeals has fulfilled the Clause’s guarantee without 
unduly burdening everyday decisions of government 
employers.  Although class-of-one suits by public 
employees rarely succeed, in this case a jury 
specifically found that Engquist carried the burden of 
proving that the Respondents: (1) “intentionally,” (2) 
treated her “differently than others similarly 
situated”; (3) “without any rational basis,” and (4) 
“solely for arbitrary, vindictive, or malicious reasons.”  
(Pet. 3a-4a.) The jury’s unanimous judgment should 
be respected.  
Equal protection rights should not—and need not—
be categorically withdrawn in the public employment 
setting.  The proper path is to leave room for courts to 
apply the set of tested rules that have proven 
successful in discouraging frivolous cases, while 
permitting meritorious ones.  
Finally, the Court of Appeals’ suggestion that 
following the Constitution might open “floodgates” is 
even more attenuated than that argument was in 
Olech.  Government officials make millions of zoning 
and licensing decisions each year, and there has been 
no flood of class-of-one claims in those contexts.  And, 
as noted, no flood of such claims burdens government 
employers in the circuits where such claims are 
allowed.  This experience, while not directly relevant 
to the interpretation of constitutional text, is yet 
another reason why this Court should reject the 
speculative reasoning of the Ninth Circuit here. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
A. 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PRO-
HIBITS STATE ACTORS FROM DIS-
CRIMINATING AGAINST INDIVIDUALS 
WITHOUT A RATIONAL BASIS.  
The Text of the Equal Protection Clause 
Protects All Persons From Unequal 
Treatment. 
The Equal Protection Clause is simple, clear, and 
direct:  “No state shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).  The text 
does not limit itself to certain classes, nor does it 
exempt public employers from its command.  
Whoever the state actor and whatever the state 
action, the Clause demands that government treat all 
similarly situated persons equally unless there is a 
rational basis for doing otherwise.  See, e.g., Village of 
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) 
(per curiam); Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 
185-87 (1992); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
The Equal Protection Clause thus “protect[s] 
persons, not groups.”  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasis omitted); 
see also  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) 
(“The rights created by . . . the Fourteenth 
Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the 
individual.  The rights established are personal 
rights.”).  The Clause prohibits the government from 
singling out individuals for harsh treatment without 
a rational basis, even if no other person falls within 
the same “classification.”  Olech, 528 U.S. at 564-65.  
In short, as this Court recently reaffirmed in Olech, 
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the text contemplates that an individual may bring a 
claim as a “class of one.”  Id.  
B. The History of the Equal Protection 
Clause Demonstrates That the Clause 
Was Originally Understood To Protect 
Individual Persons, Not Just Classes.  
Olech’s understanding that the Equal Protection 
Clause protects individuals from discrimination by a 
state actor is supported by that Clause’s history.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in large part to 
support and validate the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 
31, 14 Stat. 27, which declared that “all persons born 
in the United States . . . are hereby declared to be 
citizens of the United States” and that “such citizens, 
of every race and color, . . . shall have the same right” 
as others to “make and enforce contracts” and enjoy 
the “full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings 
for the security of person and property.”  Id. § 1.  The 
Civil Rights Act had been passed under the 
Thirteenth Amendment, which authorized Congress 
to enforce the constitutional prohibition on slavery 
through legislation.  Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 474, 1124 (1866) (statements of Sen. Trumbull 
and Rep. Cook); see U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2.  
However, when some legislators expressed doubt that 
the Act could reasonably be construed as a remedy 
against slavery, its proponents responded by 
advancing the Fourteenth Amendment, with its 
broader guarantee of equal protection for all.  Cong. 
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294, 2465 (1866) 
(statements of Rep. Wilson and Rep. Thayer); see also 
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1948).   
After adoption of the Amendment, Congress 
extended the Civil Rights Act’s protections not only to 
“citizens, of every race and color,” 1866 Act § 1, but to 
all “persons,” Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 
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Stat. 140, § 16.  This change reflects a broad 
conception of the Clause as a guarantor of personal 
rights against all forms of invidious discrimination.  
See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 
695 (1898). 
Statements by the Framers underscore the original 
understanding that the Clause protects individuals 
against discriminatory treatment.  Representative 
John Bingham, the principal architect of the Clause, 
emphasized that the constitutional right is “personal” 
and extends to “every man.”  Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 1094 (1866).  
This Court’s decisions, starting from its earliest 
pronouncements, have consistently embraced these 
principles.  Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879), 
which concerned a challenge to state court 
jurisdictional restrictions, emphasized that the Equal 
Protection Clause protects both “persons and classes 
of persons.”  Id. at 30.  The Clause “means that no 
person or class of persons shall be denied the same 
protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other 
persons or other classes in the same place and under 
like circumstances.”  Id. at 31.   
Similarly, in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 
(1884), the Court held that the Clause  
undoubtedly intended . . .  that equal protection 
and security should be given to all under like 
circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal 
and civil rights; that all persons should be 
equally entitled to pursue their happiness and 
acquire and enjoy property; . . . that no 
impediment should be interposed to the pursuits 
of any one except as applied to the same pursuits 
by others under like circumstances. . . .  
Id. at 31. 
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The Court made the same point in Atchinson, 
Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Mathews, 174 U.S. 96, 
104-05 (1899): 
[T]he equal protection guarantied by the 
constitution forbids the legislature to select a 
person, natural or artificial, and impose upon 
him or it burdens and liabilities which are not 
cast upon others similarly situated. . . . Neither 
can it make a classification of individuals or 
corporations which is purely arbitrary. . . .    
Neither Lewis nor Barbier nor Atchinson uses the 
phrase “class of one,” but all recognize the underlying 
principle that individuals, not just classes, are 
entitled to equal protection.  
C. The Fourteenth Amendment Protects 
Individuals From Unequal Treatment by 
State Officials and Agencies. 
This Court made clear early on that the Equal 
Protection guarantee protects against discrimination 
arising not only from a legislative act but also from 
the conduct of an administrative official.  Ex parte 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880), held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment “must mean that no agency 
of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its 
powers are exerted, shall deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), found that 
although the law at issue in the case was “fair on its 
face, and impartial in appearance,” it had been 
“applied and administered by public authority with 
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to 
make unjust and illegal discriminations between 
persons in similar circumstances.”  Id. at 373-74. 
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At the start of the next century, the Court expressly 
found the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to all 
state officials: 
The provisions of the 14th Amendment are not 
confined to the action of the state through its 
legislature, or through the executive or judicial 
authority.  Those provisions relate to and cover 
all the instrumentalities by which the state acts, 
and so it has been held that whoever, by virtue of 
public position under a state government, 
deprives another of any right protected by that 
amendment against deprivation by the state, 
violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he 
acts in the name of the state and for the state, 
and is clothed with the state’s powers, his act is 
that of the state.  
Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 
35-36 (1907). 
In Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Township, 
247 U.S. 350 (1918), and Sioux City Bridge Co. v. 
Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923), the Court held 
that higher tax assessments imposed by state officials 
against a single company, but not against similarly 
situated businesses, would violate the company’s 
right to equal protection if the disparate treatment 
was “intentional and arbitrary.”  Sunday Lake, 247 
U.S. at 352; accord Sioux City, 260 U.S. at 445-47; see 
also McFarland v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 
86 (1916).  Likewise, in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 
1 (1944), the Court recognized that “unequal 
application” of an otherwise neutral law constitutes a 
denial of equal protection if it intentionally targets “a 
particular class or person” or if the state official has a 
“discriminatory design to favor one individual or class 
over another.”  Id. at 8.  For “the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not permit a state to deny the equal 
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protection of its laws because such denial is not 
wholesale.”  Id. at 15 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
More recently, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal v. 
County Commission, 488 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1989), this 
Court held that state officials’ imposition on a 
landowner of an increased tax burden, not shared by 
similarly situated landowners, violated equal 
protection even though the governing statute was 
neutral on its face.  See also Hillsborough v. 
Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946); Nordlinger v. 
Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 16 n.8 (1992) (“the protections of 
the Equal Protection Clause are [not] any less when 
the classification is drawn by legislative mandate . . . 
than by administrative action . . . .”); cf. Esmail v. 
Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) 
(“A class of one is likely to be the most vulnerable of 
all.”). 
This Court’s protection of individuals from 
discriminatory treatment by government officials has 
extended well beyond the realms of regulation and 
taxation.  For example, in Wade, 504 U.S. 181, a 
criminal defendant claimed that the prosecutor 
violated his right to equal protection by failing to 
move for a reduction in sentence in light of his 
cooperation.  While the Court acknowledged that 
prosecutors must have wide discretion in such 
decisions, the Court held the defendant entitled to 
relief “if the prosecutor’s refusal to move was not 
rationally related to any legitimate Government end.”  
Id. at 186.  Notwithstanding the obvious potential for 
abuse, the Court held that the same equal protection 
analysis in Sioux City and Allegheny Pittsburgh 
should apply to cases in other contexts raising a 
class-of-one claim, even when the government has 
extremely broad discretion and even when litigants 
possess the most obvious incentives to litigate.   
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All these decisions stand for the proposition— 
reflected in the constitutional text, contemplated by 
its Framers, and understood consistently by this 
Court—that the Equal Protection Clause reaches all 
forms of alleged discrimination by state actors, 
whether premised on disparate classification of a 
group or discrimination against a single individual. 
Olech and Subsequent Precedent Follow 
From the Text and History of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
D. 
Olech’s holding flowed inexorably from the 
Constitution’s text, its original meaning, and this 
Court’s long history of protecting individuals against 
unequal treatment by state actors.  The plaintiffs in 
Olech were homeowners who claimed that the local 
government’s demand for a 33-foot easement over 
their property in exchange for a municipal water 
connection, when other homeowners had been 
required to provide only a 15-foot easement to receive 
such services, violated the Equal Protection Clause.  
528 U.S. at 563.  They alleged that the municipality’s 
differential treatment of them was “irrational and 
wholly arbitrary,” and motivated by ill will, 
occasioned by prior litigation involving the parties.  
Id.  The plaintiffs did not, however, assert 
membership in a particular group or suggest that the 
discrimination at issue resulted from a broadly 
applicable invidious classification.  Id. at 563-64.   
This Court upheld the claim.  Id. at 564-65.  In a 
per curiam opinion, citing Sioux City and Allegheny 
Pittsburgh, it stated: “Our cases have recognized 
successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class 
of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she has been 
intentionally treated differently from others similarly 
situated and that there is no rational basis for the 
difference in treatment.”  Id.  “Whether the complaint 
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alleges a class of one or of five is of no consequence 
because we conclude that the number of individuals 
in a class is immaterial for equal protection analysis.”  
Id. at 564 n.*.  Because the complaint in Olech 
alleged intentionally disparate treatment, which was 
objectively “irrational and wholly arbitrary,” this 
Court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed.  Id.   
Olech represents the logical application of this 
Court’s settled precedents.  Cases from Atchinson 
through Sioux City to Wade recognized that whatever 
the context, intentionally disparate treatment of an 
individual, no less than discriminatory classification 
of a group, violates the Equal Protection Clause if it 
is not rationally related to legitimate state goals.  
Olech simply applied these principles and selected a 
phrase to describe them: “class of one.”  See  Cobb v. 
Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court did not depart from well settled equal 
protection principles in Olech.  Rather, the Olech 
Court merely ‘reaffirmed’ that equal protection claims 
can be brought by a ‘class of one.’” (citations 
omitted)).     
In accordance with Olech and its predecessors, the 
courts of appeals have applied the class-of-one 
doctrine in a range of contexts.  For example, they 
have applied it to claims by a family alleging that 
complaints of harassment were ignored because the 
dispute involved a friend of the police, DeMuria v. 
Hawkes, 328 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 2003); by an individual 
banned from public gatherings for allegedly lewd 
dancing when other dancers were allowed to stay, 
Willis v. Town of Marshall, 426 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 
2005); by a landowner denied a construction permit 
when permits were granted to others, Bell v. 
Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2004); and by a 
real estate developer allegedly denied building 
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approvals, Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306 
(11th Cir. 2006). 
None of these opinions even questions whether the 
Equal Protection Clause applies, despite differences 
in context from Olech.  None requires that the 
plaintiff allege membership in a particular class or 
group.  Rather, all recognize that a valid class-of-one 
claim arises when the plaintiff is treated differently 
from others who are similarly situated in relevant 
respects without a rational basis.  
Nine different circuits have applied rational-basis 
scrutiny to class-of-one claims in the public 
employment context in the wake of Olech.9  Indeed, 
some circuits recognized class-of-one claims in the 
public employment context years before Olech.10 
These decisions adhere to the long-established 
principle that the Equal Protection Clause applies to 
all forms of discrimination, whatever the context and 
whoever the actor.  See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 16 
n.8; Wade, 504 U.S. at 185-87. 
                                                
9 See Stotter v. Univ. of Tex., 508 F.3d 812 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250 (6th 
Cir. 2006); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 
2006); Whiting v. Univ. of S. Miss., 451 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2006); 
Stachowski v. Town of Cicero, 425 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2005); Bizzarro v. 
Miranda, 394 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2005); Kirby v. City of Elizabeth 
City, 388 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2004); Howard v. Columbia Pub. 
Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 2004); Cobb, 363 F.3d 89; 
Wojcik v. Mass. St. Lottery Comm’n, 300 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2002); 
Hedrich v. Bd. of Regents, 274 F.3d 1174 (7th Cir. 2001); 
Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Bartell v. Aurora Pub. Schs., 263 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2001); 
Hilton, 209 F.3d at 1005. 
10 E.g., Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 
1982); Zeigler v. Jackson, 638 F.2d 776, 779 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Batra v. Bd. of Regents, 79 F.3d 717, 722 (8th Cir. 1996).   
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Of course, the Clause will be applied differently in 
different contexts.  Employment decisions are 
influenced by a host of considerations not applicable 
in other circumstances, meaning that in practice it 
will likely be more difficult to prove a lack of rational 
basis for an employment decision.  See infra Part III.    
But, regardless of how the Clause applies, it always 
applies.   
In any context, whether zoning or criminal 
prosecution or public employment, the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits intentional  
discrimination against an individual that lacks a 
rational basis.  Olech, 528 U.S. at 564; Wade, 504 
U.S. at 185-87.  As we now demonstrate, the Ninth 
Circuit erred in holding that public employees, alone 
among those subject to state action, may 
intentionally be discriminated against without any 
rational basis for the differentiation whatsoever.   
II. PUBLIC EMPLOYERS ARE STATE 
ACTORS AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ARE 
“PERSONS” ENTITLED TO “EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.” 
There is no circumstance in which a person 
absolutely loses his or her rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., Wong, 169 U.S. at 
695 (“These provisions are universal in their 
application . . . .”).  For every constitutional right that 
it has considered, including the Fourteenth 
Amendment, this Court has treated public employers 
as state actors.  This Court has not treated public 
employment as a constitution-free zone, and has not 
set aside any provision of the Constitution simply 
because the state is acting as employer.  
This result follows inexorably from the 
constitutional text: “The fourteenth amendment 
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imposes constitutional restrictions upon the ‘States’ 
as such, not upon the States acting in some capacities 
and not others.”  Robert Post, Between Governance 
and Management:  The History and Theory of the 
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1713, 1763 (1987).  
The government as employer still acts as a sovereign, 
and public employees are still citizens entitled to 
equal protection of the laws.  Collins v. City of Harker 
Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 119 (1992).  Instead of 
reading into the Fourteenth Amendment a distinction 
that the text does not reveal, this Court has applied 
the Constitution in this realm to take into account 
the “practical realities of government employment,” 
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672 (1994) 
(plurality), and the important need for “the efficient 
provision of public services,” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 
S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006). 
The divided panel below abandoned this balanced 
approach.  The need for efficiency exists in all arenas 
of government activity: in virtually every setting, the 
government must efficiently perform tasks to serve 
the public interest—in mandating easements, issuing 
licenses, and enforcing the law.  In each instance, the 
government could conceivably operate more 
efficiently if its actions were not limited by the 
Constitution.  In each instance, allowing a class-of-
one equal protection claim could theoretically give 
rise to a multitude of claims; after all, governments 
impose easements, issue licenses, and enforce the law 
in millions of decisions every day.  Yet, the 
government’s interest in efficient operations has not 
been deemed sufficient justification to set the 
Constitution aside altogether, as the Ninth Circuit 
did here.  This Court has not found that the 
government’s needs justify completely abandoning 
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any constitutional constraint on the state’s actions; it 
should not do so now. 
A. The Constitution Applies to the 
Government as Employer. 
The government is not exempt from constitutional 
limitations when it acts as employer.  “[S]tate and 
federal governments, even in the exercise of their 
internal operations, do not constitutionally have the 
complete freedom of action enjoyed by a private 
employer.”  Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 897-98 (1961).  See also 
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1958.  Indeed, this Court has 
recognized that its “responsibility is to ensure that 
citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by 
virtue of working for the government.”  Connick, 461 
U.S. at 147.   
This was not always the case.  For the first half of 
the twentieth century, the “unchallenged dogma” was 
that “a public employee had no right to object to 
conditions placed upon the terms of employment.”  Id. 
at 143 (noting the superseded doctrine and collecting 
cases).  Public employees who did “not choose to work 
on such terms [as set out by the government] . . . 
[we]re at liberty to retain their beliefs and 
associations and go elsewhere.”  Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 
342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).   
That rule—exempting the government from 
constitutional restraint in managing its employees—
has long since been repudiated. “[T]he theory that 
public employment which may be denied altogether 
may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how 
unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.” 
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of SUNY, 385 U.S. 589, 
605-06 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It 
is now firmly established that public employers are 
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state actors subject to the Constitution in their 
dealings with employees.11  For decades, this Court 
has treated public employers as state actors for 
purposes of every constitutional claim it has 
considered.   
For instance, in the context of freedom of speech 
and association, this “Court has made clear that 
public employees do not surrender all their First
Amendment rights by reason of their employment.”  
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1957; see also City of San Diego
v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per curiam).  Rather, 
the courts “arrive at a balance between the interests 
of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of 
the public services it performs through its 
employees.”  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 
568 (1968); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 142.  
As was once true of this Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence, public employees at one time were 
denied the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of 
procedural due process.  See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of 
State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 n.9 (1972).  It 
is now clear, however, that public employees are 
entitled to due process.  Id.; see also Cleveland Bd. of 
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540 (1985); NCAA 
v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988). 
Consistent with its modern First Amendment 
precedent, this Court analyzes the public employee’s 
                                                
11 Compare McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 
517 (1892) (Holmes, J.) (a policeman “may have a constitutional 
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman”), with Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 
(1967) (stating that “policemen . . . are not relegated to a 
watered-down version of constitutional rights”). 
27
entitlement to due process with consideration for the 
efficiency concerns and needs of the government 
employer.  This Court assesses whether due process 
has been denied by balancing “the private interest in 
retaining employment, the governmental interest in 
the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees 
and the avoidance of administrative burdens, and the 
risk of an erroneous termination.”  Loudermill, 470 
U.S. at 542-43 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 335 (1976)).  But a state action that deprives 
government employees of liberty or property may 
nonetheless be “so irrational that it may be branded 
‘arbitrary,’” and violate the Due Process Clause.  
Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1976). 
It is equally settled that the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition of unreasonable search and seizures 
applies to public employers.  In O’Connor v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987), a plurality observed that 
“[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights 
merely because they work for the government instead 
of a private employer.”  See also id. at 730 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von 
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).  The public 
employer’s interests are taken into account when 
courts assess the reasonableness of the search or 
seizure.   See id. at 671. 
A similar analysis applies to the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination.  See Garrity v. New 
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments “exten[d] to all, whether they 
are policemen or other members of our body politic”).  
In each of these contexts, this Court’s has 
accommodated the needs of public employers without 
giving the government a blank check to make 
employment decisions, shorn of all constitutional 
restraint. 
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This Court has rejected the claims of judges, high 
executive officials and members of Congress that they 
are absolutely immune from liability for employment 
actions.  In so doing, the Court has acknowledged 
that the government interest in effectiveness is 
counterbalanced by the “salutary effects that the 
threat of liability can have,” and the “undeniable 
tension between official immunities and the ideal of 
the rule of law.”  Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 
(1988).  Instead of absolute immunity, the proper 
balance between the government’s interest in 
effectiveness, and the employee’s constitutional 
rights, is struck by qualified immunity in 
employment challenges.  Id. at 230; Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982).  Qualified 
immunity balances rights and itself allows for the 
disposal of “insubstantial claims without resort to 
trial.”  Id. at 818.  There is, in short, no circumstance 
in which government employers are or should be 
absolutely immune from a class of constitutional 
claims. 
Finally, as discussed in the following section, it is 
axiomatic that the Equal Protection Clause 
constrains public employers.  This Court has 
expressly recognized that if a public employer 
intentionally disadvantages a suspect class, the 
Clause requires strict judicial scrutiny.12  See, e.g., 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 
(1986) (plurality); Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).  It necessarily follows that 
public employers should be treated as state actors for 
                                                
12 There is no fundamental right to government employment 
for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.  See Mass. Bd. of 
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam).  
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purposes of class-of-one claims which arise under 
precisely the same constitutional text. 
This Court’s jurisprudence thus uniformly treats 
public employers as state actors for constitutional 
purposes.   
B. As Is True of All Other Constitutional 
Claims, Class-of-One Claims May Be 
Brought Against Government 
Employers. 
Respondents bear a heavy burden.  They must 
show why a single aspect of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause—class-of-one 
claims—should be treated differently from every 
other constitutional right in the public-employment 
setting.  As demonstrated above, this Court’s practice 
is to apply the Constitution to public employers and 
to address concerns unique to the employment setting 
by delineating the cause of action to take those 
concerns into account.  There is no basis, either in the 
text of the Equal Protection Clause or in this Court’s 
cases, to depart from that practice.   
As noted, supra at 14, the text of the Equal 
Protection Clause imposes constitutional restrictions 
on the States without qualification; it does not 
distinguish the State as “taker” of private property, 
from the State as “regulator,” the State as “law 
enforcer,” or the State as “employer.”  And, neither 
the court below nor Respondents have provided any 
reason for this Court to write this unprecedented 
proviso into the Clause.  
Indeed, this Court has already rejected any such 
departure.  In Collins, 503 U.S. 115 (1992), the widow 
of a sanitation worker who drowned in a sewer line 
sued under § 1983, claiming that the city violated her 
husband’s liberty interests by not properly training 
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and warning regarding the risks of working in 
sewers.  This Court rejected the court of appeals’ 
distinction between a government acting as a 
sovereign with respect to a citizen and a government 
acting as a manager with respect to an employee: 
The Court of Appeals’ analysis rests largely on 
the fact that the city had, through allegedly 
tortious conduct, harmed one of its employees 
rather than an ordinary citizen over whom it 
exercised governmental power.  The employment 
relationship, however, is not of controlling 
significance. . . . The First Amendment, the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and other provisions of 
the Federal Constitution afford protection to 
employees who serve the government as well as to 
those who are served by them, and § 1983 
provides a cause of action for all citizens injured 
by an abridgment of those protections.  Neither 
the fact that petitioner’s decedent was a 
government employee nor the characterization of 
the city’s deliberate indifference to his safety as 
something other than an “abuse of governmental 
power” is a sufficient reason for refusing to 
entertain petitioner's federal claim under § 1983. 
Id. at 119 (emphasis added).  Collins makes clear 
that the fact that a government acts as an employer 
(rather than a sovereign) may affect the balancing of 
constitutional interests, but it does not transform 
state action into something else or nullify the 
application of the Constitution.  Collins’ analysis 
alone mandates reversal of the decision below. 
In addition, this Court has already recognized that 
the Equal Protection Clause protects a public 
employee, who is not part of any specially protected 
class, from irrational treatment by her public 
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employer. Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 
U.S. 194 (1979).  Martin, a teacher, was dismissed by 
the school board because she (along with three 
colleagues) did not comply with a continuing-
education requirement.  Because Martin “neither 
asserted nor established the existence of any suspect 
classification or the deprivation of any fundamental 
constitutional right,” the Court found “the only 
inquiry is whether the State’s classification is 
rationally related to the State's objective.”  Id. at 199 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
Although this Court ultimately concluded that 
Martin was not “deprived of equal protection of the 
laws” because the school board’s action was rationally 
related to a legitimate objective, id., the critical point 
here is that this Court never questioned that the 
Equal Protection Clause protected Martin against 
irrational and unequal treatment at the hands of her 
public employer. 
Martin and Collins share the same premise as 
Olech: The Clause protects persons from irrational or 
arbitrary state discrimination.  This Court has 
repeatedly characterized its cases addressing 
constitutional claims subject to heightened scrutiny 
as forbidding arbitrary or irrational treatment of 
such employees, using the same language Olech uses 
to describe a class-of-one claim.  See Cafeteria 
Workers, 367 U.S. at 897-98 (“We may assume that 
[the public employee] could not constitutionally have 
been excluded from [her workplace] if the announced 
grounds for her exclusion had been patently arbitrary 
or discriminatory . . . .”); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 
U.S. 183, 192 (1952) (“It is sufficient to say that 
constitutional protection does extend to the public 
servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is 
patently arbitrary or discriminatory.”).   
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Furthermore, in cases raising public employees’ 
constitutional claims that do not call for strict 
scrutiny, this Court has employed the same 
formulation.  See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313; Rutan v. 
Repub. Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 98 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“When dealing with its own employees, 
the government may not act in a manner that is 
‘patently arbitrary or discriminatory,’ but its 
regulations are valid if they bear a ‘rational 
connection’ to the governmental end sought to be 
served.”) (citations omitted). 
In sum, this Court has held, repeatedly, that public 
employers are bound by the Equal Protection Clause 
for purposes of both strict scrutiny and rational-basis 
review.  The text, history, and precedent interpreting 
the Clause prohibit exempting government employers 
alone from class-of-one liability. 
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Should Be 
Reversed Because It Wrongly Equates 
Public and Private Employment. 
In seeking an exception to the Court’s usual 
practice of considering the employment setting as a 
factor in how (and not whether) to apply the 
Constitution to the state as employer, both 
Respondents and the divided panel below asserted 
that the state is not acting as a sovereign when it 
acts as employer.  As demonstrated above, this view 
is plainly inconsistent with this Court’s precedent. 
Further, even when acting as an employer, the 
government remains the sovereign, capable of 
relating to its employees in ways that are impossible 
for private employers.  For example: 
 No private employer has the power to 
legislate the terms and conditions of 
employment for its employees, removing 
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their susceptibility to negotiation.  
 No private employer has the power to enact a 
law forbidding strikes by employees holding 
particular positions critical to the company 
and to the public interest.  But see Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 243.736 (2007). 
 No private employer can fund its retiree 
benefits plans and programs with the public 
fisc. But see Or. Rev. Stat. § 238A.025 (2007). 
 No private employer is entitled to sovereign 
immunity.  In contrast, sovereign immunity 
ordinarily bars damages suits against states, 
even when important federal laws are at 
issue.  See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 732-33 (1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (holding that 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
does not abrogate sovereign immunity); Bd. 
of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act does not 
abrogate sovereign immunity). 
Public employees’ constitutional rights have never 
been abrogated in their entirety; they are, at most, 
qualified in some respects. Just as “[c]onstitutional 
protection against unreasonable searches by the 
government does not disappear merely because the 
government has the right to make reasonable 
intrusions in its capacity as employer,” O’Connor, 480 
U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring), constitutional 
protection against illegitimate discrimination does 
not disappear merely because the government has 
the right to make rational decisions in its capacity as 
employer. 
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The Ninth Circuit ignored the fundamental 
distinction between limiting a constitutional right 
and eliminating it altogether.  In an attempt to 
support its conclusion by analogy to the First and 
Fourth Amendment contexts, the Ninth Circuit 
recognized that “the Court has limited the rights of 
public employees as compared to ordinary citizens.”  
Pet. 24a (emphasis added).  Then, however, the panel 
abruptly transformed “limited” into “eliminated,” 
thereby stripping public employees of the right of 
“every person within the State’s jurisdiction” to be 
secure “against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination.”  Olech, 528 U.S. at 564 (citation 
omitted).  
Neither the text of the Equal Protection Clause nor 
this Court’s cases suggest that public employers may 
intentionally, arbitrarily, and irrationally treat 
similarly situated persons differently.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment exists as a limitation on 
state action, see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 
U.S. 922, 924 (1982), irrespective of the capacity in 
which the state acts.     
Rather than eliminating constitutional constraints 
on states when they act as employers, this Court  
should do what it has done with respect to all other 
constitutional rights in the context of public 
employment—carefully delineate the class-of-one 
cause of action to protect the relevant government 
interests and the employee’s constitutional rights.   
III. PROPER APPLICATION OF RATIONAL 
BASIS REVIEW APPROPRIATELY LIMITS 
CLASS-OF-ONE CLAIMS BY PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES.   
Traditional class-of-one equal protection analysis 
requires a plaintiff to show that a public employer 
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has intentionally treated similarly situated 
employees differently for reasons that are not 
rationally related to any legitimate government 
interest.  This requirement appropriately limits class-
of-one claims, fully accommodates the government’s 
interests as employer, and deters inappropriate and 
irrational government conduct that ill-serves the 
public’s interest in fair and efficient government. 
A. Plaintiffs Bear the Significant Burden of 
Proving Each Element of a Class-Of-One 
Claim. 
To make out a successful class-of-one claim, a 
plaintiff must establish that: (1) the government 
treated him or her differently from other similarly 
situated persons; (2) the difference in treatment was 
intentional; and (3) the difference in treatment was 
not rationally related to any legitimate government 
purpose.  See Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.   
Each element of this claim is a significant hurdle 
for plaintiffs asserting class-of-one claims, and all 
must be satisfied for the plaintiff to prevail.  
Experience with such claims in the federal courts 
demonstrates that it is difficult for plaintiffs to prove 
the elements of a class-of-one claim; only a handful of 
such claims have succeeded.  The cause of action 
itself, and the difficulties plaintiffs face in proving 
each element, inherently limit the number of 
successful class-of-one cases and ensure that run-of-
the-mill government employment decisions will not 
be subjected to constitutional scrutiny.  See Cordi-
Allen v. Conlon, 494 F.3d 245, 255 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(“The Olech class of one suit serves an important but 
relatively narrow function. It is not a vehicle for 
federalizing run-of-the-mill zoning, environmental, 
and licensing decisions.”). 
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1. 
                                               
The Plaintiff Must Prove That the 
Government’s Differential Treatment 
Was Intentional. 
To begin, a plaintiff making a class-of-one equal 
protection claim must demonstrate that the 
government’s differential treatment of him or her was 
intentional—not the result of chance, mistake, or 
careless error.  Mere differences in treatment cannot 
form the basis of a claim: the government must have 
deliberately differentiated between like individuals.  
This element of the cause of action emerges directly 
from Olech.  See 528 U.S. at 564.  
Olech’s intent requirement flows from this Court’s 
decision in Snowden to limit the government’s 
liability in cases involving unintended error.  In 
Snowden, the Court explained that “an erroneous or 
mistaken performance of [a] statutory duty, although 
a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial 
of the equal protection of the laws.”  321 U.S. at 8.  
Rather, an additional requirement is the “element of 
intentional or purposeful discrimination.”  Id.  
Similarly, in Sunday Lake, 247 U.S. 350, this Court 
recognized that the Equal Protection Clause does not 
prohibit unequal taxation that results from an honest 
mistake.  See also Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 
F.2d 511, 522, 523 (7th Cir. 1982) (equal protection 
“does not mean that error or mistake in the 
application of the law gives rise to an equal 
protection claim,” but “[r]ather, [when] it was an 
intentional act with no rational basis”).13 In this case, 
 
13 For example, Giordano, 274 F.3d 740, rejected a challenge 
to retire a police officer as disabled “because of his regimen on 
the drug Coumadin.”  Id. at 742.  While the plaintiff showed 
that the department retained another officer taking Coumadin, 
the plaintiff presented “no evidence . . . that those responsible 
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the jury found, and Respondents have never 
disputed, that their treatment of Engquist was 
intentional. 
2. 
                                                                                                
The Plaintiff Must Prove That He or 
She Was Treated Differently From 
Other Similarly Situated Persons.  
A class-of-one plaintiff must also establish that he 
or she was treated differently from others similarly 
situated in relevant respects.  Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.  
This requirement screens out cases that involve no 
genuine discrimination, while permitting cases that 
do.  
The courts of appeals have scrupulously applied the 
“similarly situated” requirement to require class-of-
one plaintiffs to establish significantly unequal 
treatment, eliminating de minimis and insubstantial 
claims.  See, e.g., Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 
F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting class-of-one 
claim where public employee could not point to 
similarly-situated employees); Neilson v. D’Angelis, 
409 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2005) (factual comparison 
to comparators “too remote” to support similarity).     
The First Circuit’s application of this condition 
highlights its limiting effect in the public-
employment context.  “Plaintiffs claiming an equal 
protection violation must first identify and relate 
specific instances where persons situated similarly in 
all relevant aspects were treated differently.”  
Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 910 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).  
See also Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 178 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (finding that, although “an exact 
for terminating him because of his Coumadin use knew they 
were treating him differently from anyone else.”  Id. at 751. 
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correlation need not exist between a plaintiff’s 
situation and that of others,” the claim failed because 
no comparators were similarly situated (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Jennings v. City of 
Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004); 
Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1203-04 
(11th Cir. 2007).  
Only where the plaintiff can present evidence that 
the government has treated unequally people who are 
similarly situated in the respects relevant to the 
differential treatment will a class-of-one claim be 
permitted to proceed.  See Zeigler, 638 F.2d at 779;14
Ciechon, 686 F.2d at 522-23.  This principle captures 
the essence of the equal protection violation, namely, 
the government’s treatment of similar people in 
different ways without a rational basis for the 
discrimination.  In this case, the jury explicitly found 
that the government singled Engquist out for harsher 
treatment than the similarly situated individuals in 
the LSD.   Pet. 3a-4a. 
                                                
14 In Zeigler, a police department discharged a patrolman 
pursuant to a “character requirement” following his convictions 
for presenting a firearm and criminal provocation, 638 F.2d at 
777. In his challenge, the plaintiff presented evidence of “at 
least three individuals . . . retained on the police force following 
their convictions” of similar crimes.  Id. at 779.  Given the 
similarity of the offenses and the fact that all officers were 
“equally subject to the character requirement” and its offense 
list, they were similarly situated.  Id.  That was so despite any 
number of differences between the three officers in their 
employment and personal characteristics; the inquiry properly 
focused only on whether those individual characteristics were 
relevant to the state’s proffered rationale for its action. 
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3. The Plaintiff Must Establish That 
The Unequal Treatment Is Not 
Rationally Related to a Legitimate 
Government Purpose.  
The third element of class-of-one claims requires a 
plaintiff to demonstrate that the government’s 
intentional discrimination was without a legitimate 
basis.  This Court has explained that “a classification 
neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding 
along suspect lines . . . cannot run afoul of the Equal 
Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship 
between disparity of treatment and some legitimate 
governmental purpose.”  Cent. State Univ. v. Am. 
Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124, 127-28 (1999) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
“Rational basis” review is premised on the judicial 
deference due to governmental policy decisions 
resulting from democratic processes, see, e.g., United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 
(1938).  Yet, this Court’s jurisprudence has 
consistently reaffirmed that state action against a 
nonsuspect class fails even this relaxed scrutiny if, 
inter alia, the classification is based on an “irrational 
prejudice” rather than legitimate governmental 
interests, see, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-50, or if 
the asserted policy reason for the justification is not 
“plausible,” see, e.g., Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 11. 
In rational-basis cases, the plaintiff must overcome 
a strong presumption in favor of the government. 
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981).  To be 
sure, the plaintiff always has an opportunity to 
negate the government’s asserted bases for its 
discriminatory classification or treatment.  If the 
reasons the government puts forward for treating an 
individual unequally reveal an illegitimate purpose, 
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or are not rationally related to the proffered objective, 
then the plaintiff can prevail. 
In Cleburne, for example, this Court invalidated the 
application of an ordinance requiring a home for the 
mentally disabled to obtain a “special use permit” 
before constructing a new facility.  See 473 U.S. at 
450.  The plaintiffs prevailed by establishing that 
each of the defendant city’s asserted rationales for 
the discriminatory treatment was either unrelated to 
a legitimate objective or was based on an illegitimate 
purpose.  This Court concluded that the classification 
bore no rational relationship to more legitimate 
government objectives, such as concerns about 
overcrowding or the possibility of a flood.  Id. at 449-
50.   
The Equal Protection Clause is a guarantee against 
discriminatory treatment, not adverse government 
actions (unless they affect fundamental rights).15
Thus, equal protection analysis does not focus on 
whether the government had a rational basis for 
harming someone—instead it focuses on whether the 
                                                
15 For this reason, cases in which this Court has refrained 
from recognizing certain Due Process Clause rights for public 
employees, e.g., Collins, 503 U.S. 115; Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 
341 (1976), bear no relation to the guarantee the Equal 
Protection Clause provides against intentional discriminatory 
treatment at the hands of government actors.  Although the Due 
Process Clause only protects against the deprivation of discrete 
recognized interests, the Equal Protection Clause applies to all 
persons, whether or not they are part of a special class or 
exercising a special right.  Unlike the plaintiffs in Bishop and 
Collins, Engquist does not seek recognition of a special right, 
nor does she ask the courts to impose any novel duty on public 
employers.  And unlike the plaintiffs in these Due Process 
Clause cases, Engquist does allege—and a jury found—that she 
was treated differently from similarly situated individuals, and 
discriminated against irrationally by the government. 
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government had a rational basis for harming one 
person and not another.  As Olech explains, this 
Court’s “cases have recognized successful equal 
protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,’ where 
the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally 
treated differently from others similarly situated and 
that there is no rational basis for the difference in 
treatment.”  528 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added).  For 
this reason, an equal protection plaintiff need not 
establish that the government had no rational basis 
for taking action against her.  But the plaintiff is 
required to prove that the government had no 
rational basis for taking action against her as 
opposed to somebody else similarly situated.   
A governmental employment decision is thus 
rational whenever the discrimination relates to a 
legitimate government interest.  E.g., Bizzarro v. 
Miranda, 394 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2005).  In practice, 
it has been difficult for plaintiffs to show that the 
government has failed to meet this standard, 
particularly in the context of public employment.  For 
example, the courts of appeals have noted that a 
government employer’s disciplinary decision is 
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose 
where the employee violated an established rule or 
policy.  See Wojcik, 300 F.3d at 105; Lauth v. 
McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2005).  Only 
an arbitrary governmental deviation from established 
policy undermines the rationality of the government’s 
proffered basis for action.  See Zeigler v. Jackson, 638 
F.2d 776, 779 (5th Cir. 1981). 
The rationality of a government employment 
decision relying on either an employee rule violation 
or a legitimate government purpose reduces the 
universe of potentially irrational government 
decisions.  Accordingly, court conclusions of 
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irrationality have been largely confined to cases in 
which the plaintiff employee demonstrates animus or 
improper motive on the part of the government 
decision-maker.  See Scarbrough, 470 F.3d at 261; 
Ciechon, 686 F.2d at 516. 
These principles, at the heart of rational basis 
review, have effectively limited the number of class-
of-one cases.  The Equal Protection Clause does not 
require perfect equality in treatment for all similarly 
situated individuals.  Instead, a plaintiff must prove 
that the government’s discrimination is not rationally 
related to a legitimate government purpose, a 
showing possible for only that tiny fraction of 
plaintiffs who have suffered intentional, irrational, 
and discriminatory government treatment.  In this 
case, Engquist alleged malice and the jury can be 
said to have credited her evidence that she was 
discriminated against because of Respondents’ ill-will 
instead of a legitimate government purpose. 
4. The Presence of Animus, Ill-Will, 
Malice, or Vindictiveness. 
If the government is unable to articulate a rational 
basis for discriminating against an individual 
plaintiff, it follows that the government’s 
discrimination was either arbitrary or motivated by 
animus.  
In Cleburne itself, after negating the proffered 
rationales, this Court emphasized that the city’s 
decision “appears to us to rest on an irrational 
prejudice.”  473 U.S. at 450.  In other words, rather 
than looking behind the record to evaluate the 
subjective intent of the city’s decision to require a 
“special use permit,” the Court concluded that the 
city’s offered justifications were facially unconvincing.  
See, e.g., id. (noting that the city’s interests in 
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“avoiding concentration of population” and “lessening 
congestion of the streets . . . obviously fail to explain 
why apartment houses, fraternity and sorority 
houses, hospitals and the like, may freely locate in 
the area without a permit”). 
Like Cleburne, this Court’s decision in Olech did 
not require a plaintiff to allege animus.  Olech, 528 
U.S. at 565 (permitting claim due to allegations of 
“irrational and wholly arbitrary” government action, 
without reaching “the alternative theory of ‘subjective 
ill will’ relied on by [the lower] court”).  Justice 
Breyer’s concurring opinion nonetheless viewed 
allegations of “‘vindictive action,’ ‘illegitimate 
animus,’ or ‘ill will’” as sufficient to state a class-of-
one claim.  Id. at 566 (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
result).  Following Justice Breyer, several courts, 
including the trial court in this case, have looked to 
animus or vindictiveness in assessing class-of-one 
violations.  
Proof of animus need not, however, be an 
independent, additional factor in class-of-one cases.  
Rather, courts use evidence of malice and 
vindictiveness as a proxy for other elements that a 
plaintiff must prove.  Given the potential value of 
evidence of animus in reducing the likelihood of 
elevating innocuous government mistakes to 
constitutional issues, courts have looked to evidence 
of animus and vindictiveness as probative of (1) 
whether the classification is rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose, (2) the existence of 
similarly situated comparators, and (3) the 
intentional nature of the governmental 
discrimination.   
For example, in Scarbrough, 470 F.3d 250, the 
Sixth Circuit relied on evidence of improper animus 
undergirding a governmental employment decision to 
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establish the irrationality of the government action.  
In that case, the defendant board of education 
refused to rehire the plaintiff as the director of 
schools after plaintiff was asked to speak at a church 
convention with “a predominantly gay and lesbian 
congregation.” Id. at 253-54.  Reviewing the board’s 
differential treatment of the plaintiff, as compared to 
the successful candidate, for “rationality,” the court 
noted that “[t]he desire to effectuate one’s animus 
against homosexuals can never be a legitimate 
governmental purpose.”  Id. at 261 (citation omitted). 
Noting that a “plaintiff may demonstrate that the 
government action lacks a rational basis either [1] by 
negativing every conceivable basis which might 
support the government action, or [2] by 
demonstrating that the challenged government action 
was motivated by animus or ill-will,” id. at 261 
(citation omitted), the court concluded that the 
plaintiff “offered sufficient evidence to create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether [board 
members] were motivated by animus against 
homosexuals.”  Id.   
Similarly, the First Circuit has viewed evidence 
that the governmental decision was motivated by 
vindictiveness or animus as relevant to the 
requirement that the plaintiff be treated differently 
from others who are similarly situated.  See Cordi-
Allen, 494 F.3d at 251 n.4 (“We note that the degree 
of similarity required may be relaxed somewhat if the 
plaintiff has presented evidence of personal malice 
and bad faith retaliation.”  (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Otherwise, a class-of-one plaintiff would 
face greater difficulty in establishing a claim where 
the plaintiff produced significant evidence of 
animosity underlying the government action, because 
that animosity would itself distinguish the plaintiff 
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from potentially similarly situated comparators.  See 
U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 179 (1991) 
(“[w]e generally accord . . . official conduct a 
presumption of legitimacy”); United States v. Chem. 
Found., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926) (“The presumption of 
regularity supports the official acts of public officers, 
and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, 
courts presume that they have properly discharged 
their official duties.”) 
Moreover, a plaintiff’s evidence of vindictiveness or 
malice can be used to demonstrate that the mere act 
of discrimination was committed intentionally.  In 
class-of-one challenges to governmental regulation, 
the regulation itself might give rise to an inference of 
improper motive, but in the employment context the 
plaintiff may need to demonstrate personal 
vindictiveness or malice in order to prove that the 
unequal treatment was intentionally directed at her.  
Indeed, although subjective intent has little—if 
anything—to contribute to analysis of whether 
particular legislation is “rational,” it understandably 
plays a greater role in assessing the propriety of 
governmental employment decisions.  See, e.g., 
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) 
(noting the reliance upon subjective intent in 
employment cases alleging disparate treatment).    
Here, as in Olech, this Court need not decide as a 
general rule whether proof of malicious or vindictive 
conduct is necessary in order to state a class-of-one 
claim.  It would suffice merely to adopt the principle, 
as have so many courts of appeals, that a finding of 
animus is highly relevant to establishing the 
elements required to prove an equal protection 
violation. 
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5. The Jury Found the Government’s 
Different Treatment of Engquist to 
Be Without Any Rational Basis. 
Because plaintiffs face significant hurdles in 
proving a class-of-one claim, as established in Olech, 
allowing plaintiffs to bring such claims does not 
substantially burden the day-to-day administration of 
government, but it does protect individuals from the 
rare circumstance in which the government 
discriminates without a rational basis.  Although it is 
difficult for a plaintiff to overcome the rational basis 
test, it is not impossible.  See, e.g., Hooper v. 
Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985) 
(invalidating a New Mexico tax exemption because 
there was no reason for the state to “prefer 
established resident veterans over newcomers in the 
retroactive apportionment of an economic benefit”); 
see also Allegheny Pittsburgh, 488 U.S. at 345-46.   
In Olech itself, this Court found that the Village 
lacked a rational basis for requiring the respondents 
to cede it a 33-foot easement in exchange for 
connecting their property to the municipal water 
supply when similarly situated property owners were 
asked only for 15-foot easements.  
Here, the district court properly instructed the jury 
on all of the elements Engquist needed to prove to 
win her class-of-one equal protection claim.  Pursuant 
to the judge’s instructions, the jury found in this case 
that (1)  “the acts . . . of the defendants were 
intentional,” (2) the plaintiff “prove[d] that 
defendants treated her differently than others 
similarly situated,” (3) “the different treatment 
caused the denial of Plaintiff’s promotion, the 
exercise of her bumping rights or the termination of 
her employment,” (4) “no rational basis exists for the 
difference in treatment,” and (5) “Defendant took 
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these actions for arbitrary, vindictive, or malicious 
reasons.”  JA 63-64.  By finding each of these factors, 
the jury’s verdict places Engquist’s case in the small 
set of cases in which plaintiffs are able to prove that 
unequal treatment at the hands of the government is 
not rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose. 
B. Employees’ Class-of-One Claims Are 
Inherently Limited by the Wide Array of 
Public Employers’ Legitimate 
Objectives. 
For a class-of-one claim to succeed, the plaintiff 
must establish that the government’s discrimination 
was not rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose.  In practice, this has proven a high hurdle 
for plaintiffs to clear, especially in the public-
employment setting, in which government has a wide 
array of legitimate interests that justify differential 
treatment of employees.   
Indeed, the range of legitimate government 
objectives is likely to be far greater in the 
employment context than in others.  For example, a 
government employer, like a private employer, has a 
legitimate interest in retaining a competent and 
professional workforce and promoting collegiality in 
the workplace.  Accordingly, the government 
employer generally can reasonably terminate an 
individual on the basis that he or she lacks adequate 
knowledge of the relevant subject matter or is 
antisocial or insubordinate.  It follows that public 
employees will have fewer opportunities to bring a 
valid class-of-one claim than citizens subject to other 
government action. 
For example, it would not be rationally related to a 
legitimate government objective for a zoning official 
48
to deny a home permit to an individual based on the 
official’s belief that the individual was antisocial.  In 
contrast, for an agency to terminate an employee for 
the same reason generally would relate rationally to 
a legitimate interest of a government employer.  
Unlike the zoning official, the public employer often 
must take into account the individual personalities 
and interpersonal relationships of employees in the 
workplace.  The close relationship between the 
employer and employee, and the varied needs and 
interests involved in the employment context, mean 
that considerations such as concerns over personality 
conflicts that would be unreasonable as grounds for 
“arm’s-length” government decisions (e.g., zoning, 
licensing) may well justify different treatment of a 
public employee.   
Public employers in different fields have cited to a 
vast array of specific legitimate objectives in the 
courts of appeals.  In Bizzarro, for instance, a 
corrections officer refused to assist his superiors in 
conducting an internal prison investigation into the 
shipment of contraband into the facility.  394 F.3d at 
83.  The court concluded that the ensuing disciplinary 
charges were “rationally related” to the department’s 
legitimate need to eliminate contraband.  Id. at 88-
89.  The rationality of a government decision relying 
on either an employee rule violation or a legitimate 
policy interest further reduces the universe of 
potentially illegitimate government decisions. 
Still, not all public employment decisions will be 
related to a “legitimate” government objective.  See 
Scarbrough, 470 F.3d at 261 (“animus against 
homosexuals can never be a legitimate governmental 
purpose”); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-47 (“[S]ome 
objectives—such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group,’—are not legitimate state 
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interests.”) (citation omitted).  If an employee is 
discriminated against for having some particular 
personal characteristic unrelated to workplace 
efficiency, or belonging to some unpopular group, this 
does not serve a legitimate government objective.  So 
too, it serves no legitimate interest of the government 
if an employee is discriminated against for whistle-
blowing, or because a boss has been bribed to hire 
somebody else.   
Nonetheless, the wide range of legitimate bases for 
discriminatory treatment that are unique to the 
employment relationship places firm limits on class-
of-one employment cases. 
C. Public Employers Have Been Subject to 
Rational-Basis Review For Years With 
No Ill Effects. 
Both before and since Olech, circuit and district 
courts have applied a variety of principles that limit 
the field of class-of-one public employment cases.  
Such claims have placed no strain on the docket.  
In the seven years since Olech was decided, only 
162 reported public employment cases—
approximately 24 cases per year—even asserted an 
Olech class-of-one equal-protection violation in 
federal court.  All but a handful were disposed of via 
summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.  These 
small numbers are dwarfed by the large number of 
employment suits filed every year.  In fiscal year 
2006, there were nearly 15,000 claims of employment 
discrimination filed in federal court alone.  Judicial 
Business of the United States Courts, 2006 Annual 
Report of the Director, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html.  The 
relatively small number of class-of-one public 
employment cases filed over the course of seven 
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years—even though no circuit (until now) has held 
them invalid—demonstrates that applying this 
doctrine to public employment has not led, and will 
not lead, to a flood of litigation.16 
                                                
16 The Ninth Circuit’s decision was driven in part by concern 
that allowing class-of-one claims by public employees would 
“invalidate the practice of public at-will employment.”  Pet. 25a.  
This concern is misplaced for several reasons.   
First, “[i]t is the former employee who has the burden of 
proving that his discharge was motivated by an impermissible 
consideration,” Rutan, 497 U.S. at 80 (Stevens, J., concurring)—
here, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  “There is a 
clear distinction between the grant of tenure to an employee—a 
right which cannot be conferred by judicial fiat—and the 
prohibition of a discharge for a particular impermissible reason.”  
Id. at 80-81 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Second, as noted supra, a class-of-one claim must be based on 
intentional conduct and differential treatment of similarly 
situated employees.  A public employer, accordingly, can 
terminate or discipline an at-will employee “without cause” if its 
conduct is not intentional and if there is no differential 
treatment of similarly situated employees.  
Third, the Ninth Circuit’s prediction is devoid of practical 
support.  Nine circuits permit such claims, and there is no flood 
of class-of-one claims—let alone successful claims—by formerly 
at-will employees.  
Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s quotation of Waters, 511 U.S. at 
679, for the proposition that “an at-will government 
employee . . . generally has no claim based on the Constitution 
at all,” misreads the decision.  In Waters itself, the Court 
granted all public employees—whether at-will or not—a right to 
sue their employers for violations of First Amendment rights. 
 See id. at 678.  This Court has made clear that at-will 
employees may bring constitutional claims against their public 
employers.  E.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972) 
(although at-will employment status is “highly relevant to [an  
employee’s] procedural due process claim[,]” a “lack  of formal 
contractual or  tenure security in continued  employment . . . [is]  
irrelevant to his free  speech claim”). In sum, there is no need to 
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In comparison to the numerous avenues into courts 
already available to plaintiffs in employment 
disputes—any of which may permit extensive 
discovery—it is difficult to envision a circumstance in 
which the class-of-one claim would seriously alter the 
current litigation balance in the trial courts. 
  Public employees who are members of no special 
class can still allege substantive and procedural due 
process violations, retaliation in violation of the First 
Amendment, and a variety of other claims.17  And no 
matter what the race or gender of a public employee 
may be, that employee can allege discrimination (or 
so-called “reverse discrimination”) under § 1983—
with its accompanying heightened scrutiny, which 
will undoubtedly be more attractive to litigants than 
the deferential “rational basis” standard.   
This case amply demonstrates the point: Ms. 
Engquist asserted statutory and substantive due 
process violations in addition to her equal-protection 
claim.  Even if Ms. Engquist had no class-of-one 
equal-protection claim, discovery in her case would 
have proceeded, and the case would have gone to 
trial.  JA 36 (“The court finds that this evidence is 
sufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether 
defendants were motivated to terminate plaintiff for 
discriminatory reasons” in violation of Title VII.); id. 
at 40-41 (denying government’s motion for summary 
judgment with respect to substantive due process 
claim).  See also Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929-
                                                                                                
eliminate the constitutional right to equal protection for public 
employees to preserve at-will public employment. 
17 Other statutory and constitutional causes of action 
available to public employees are no substitute for their right to 
equal protection.  Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 
668, 680 (1996).  Each constitutional provision guarantees 
discrete rights.  
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31 (1997) (suggesting that the Due Process Clause 
protects against disciplinary measures short of 
termination).  
Of the 162 public employment cases filed over the 
past seven years alleging a class-of-one equal 
protection violation, the vast majority asserted other 
causes of action as well.  Thus, curtailing the equal-
protection rights of a class-of-one public employee 
would do little, if anything, to reduce the caseload of 
the federal courts.18 
                                                
18 Allowing a cause of action for Ms. Engquist, a state 
employee, would not automatically create a class-of-one remedy 
for federal employees, whether at-will or not.  Congress has 
provided a statutory cause of action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to remedy 
constitutional violations committed by state and local officials.  
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).  However, no similar 
statute provides a general cause of action to remedy 
constitutional violations committed by federal government 
officials.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).  In Bivens, this 
Court suggested that it would not craft a cause of action for a 
constitutional violation by the federal government if the plaintiff 
had available another remedy, “equally effective in the view of 
Congress.”  403 U.S. at 397.  This Court first applied that 
exception in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), where in light 
of extensive federal civil service protections it declined to create 
a cause of action for a constitutional suit by a federal employee 
against his public employer.  A similar analysis would be 
applicable here. 
In contrast to cases concerning the availability of a Bivens 
remedy, as a general rule this Court does not consider the 
availability of state laws and procedures for substantive 
constitutional claims brought under § 1983.  Monroe, 365 U.S. at 
183.  In the limited context of procedural due process cases, this 
Court does consider available state law remedies to determine 
whether a constitutional violation has occurred, for a 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property “is not complete unless 
and until the State fails to provide due process.”  Zinermon v. 
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990); see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 
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Moreover, federal courts have available a range of 
procedural tools to prevent meritless cases from 
moving forward and clogging up the courts.  For 
example, through the requirements of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8 or other mechanisms under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (such as Rule 56(f)), 
courts can require plaintiffs to plead and produce 
evidence of the facts that support a class-of-one claim.  
Indeed, this Court has recently clarified that, to 
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 
S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).  
In practice, accordingly, a plaintiff cannot just 
plead the legal elements of a class-of-one claim 
without more, but must also plead facts sufficient to 
demonstrate that each element of his or her claim has 
been satisfied in the public employment setting.  See 
id. at 1965 (“[F]ormulaic recitation of the elements of 
a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations 
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level.”).  Thus, when faced with a class-of-
one complaint that fails to make plausible factual 
allegations that the government’s action was 
                                                                                                
U.S. 527, 531-35 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 522-30 
(1984).  Thus, in that one “special” category of cases, “to 
determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred, it is 
necessary to ask what process the State provided, and whether 
it was constitutionally adequate.”  Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125.   
When suits concern substantive constitutional rights, though, 
“the constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 is complete 
when the wrongful action is taken.”  Id. (citations omitted); see 
also Collins, 503 U.S. at 119-20 (“[T]he Equal Protection . . . 
Clause[] . . . afford[s] protection to employees who serve the 
government as well as to those who are served by them, and 
§ 1983 provides a cause of action for all citizens injured by an 
abridgment of [it].”). 
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irrational and intentional, the lower courts can 
dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(6).  See Ass’n of 
Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 
545, 548-50 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying Twombly to 
class-of-one claim and concluding that plaintiffs 
raised insufficient factual allegations to “raise a right 
to relief above the speculative level” (quoting 
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965)); Phillips v. County of 
Allegheny, No. 06-2869, 2008 WL 305025 (3d Cir. 
Feb. 5, 2008) (discussing in detail pleading 
requirements for class-of-one equal protection claims, 
and noting Twombly). 
Other mechanisms provided by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure also allow courts to dispose of 
meritless class-of-one cases quickly.  For example, 
prior to discovery, “the court may order a reply to the 
defendant’s or a third party’s answer under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a), or grant the defendant’s 
motion for a more definite statement under Rule 
12(e).”  Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 
(1998); see also Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1432-
33 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (upholding the district 
courts’ power in qualified-immunity cases to order a 
reply pleading far greater detail than that required 
by Rule 8(a)(2)). 
The combination of the substantive elements of a 
class-of-one cause of action and certain tools 
embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
allows courts to address such claims, while balancing 
the equal protection rights of public employees with 
the appropriate discretion governmental employers 
have in making employment decisions.  And, in fact, 
this is what has happened.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
unsubstantiated speculation that allowing class-of-
one claims will overwhelm the federal courts and 
public employers with litigation is proven wrong by 
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the courts’ actual experience in the nine circuits 
where such claims have been authorized.19 
Finally, there is no reason to believe that more and 
more insubstantial class-of-one claims will arise in 
the public-employment context than in other 
government settings, such as the land-use context 
addressed in Olech.  State and local governments 
make millions of zoning and licensing decisions each
year.20  State and local prosecutors make hundreds of 
                                                
19 Notably, the rational-basis standard that applies to class-of-
one claims is virtually identical to the standard this Court 
applies in assessing whether a union—which has both a 
statutory duty to represent its members and an obligation to 
“govern” in the overall interest of the bargaining unit as a 
whole—has breached its duty to individual members.  In 
balancing these interests, this Court has held that “a union 
breaches its duty of fair representation if its actions are either 
‘arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,’” and “that a union’s 
actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal 
landscape at the time of the union’s actions, the union’s behavior 
is so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness,’ as to be 
irrational.’”  Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 
(1991) (citation omitted).  Negligence is not enough.  United 
Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372 (1990).  Like unions, 
public employers have government and public interests to 
serve—interests that must be balanced against employees’ 
rights not to be intentionally treated arbitrarily or irrationally.  
The Court designed its fair-representation test to balance the 
relevant interests, and it has proven wholly workable.  There is 
no reason why class-of-one claims would be any different. 
20 “[Z]oning decisions . . . occur thousands of times every day 
in this country.”  Lemke v. Cass County, 846 F.2d 469, 471 (8th 
Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring).  There were over 1.8 million 
building permits issued for new construction in 2006.  U.S. 
Census Bureau, Building Permits-Annual Data, available at 
http://www.census.gov/const/bpann.pdf.   
Oklahoma issued 3 million licenses in fiscal year 1998, 
including over 1 million business licenses.  Marie Price, New 
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thousands more.21  And prisons and jails similarly 
make millions of individualized decisions each year.  
In many of these contexts, a plaintiff can assert that 
the government is behaving improperly, and file a 
federal lawsuit to, for example, strike down a housing 
inspection failure, reinstate a liquor license, undo a 
plea agreement, or contest the imposition of prison 
discipline.   
While the wholesale elimination of constitutional 
rights would certainly cut the number of federal 
cases, that course is both impermissible and 
unnecessary.  Instead, the discretion built into 
rational-basis review, coupled with the traditional 
tools that federal courts have employed to manage 
such cases, reserves the class-of-one claim for 
appropriate cases of irrational and arbitrary 
government conduct.  Public employees, who after all 
serve our citizenry, should have the same rights as 
the variety of other persons whose ability to bring 
rational-basis challenges has been affirmed by this 
Court. 
                                                                                                
Law Aimed at Licensing Businesses, Journal Record, June 30, 
1998. 
New York’s Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control “regulates 
nearly 70,000 licenses and permits statewide each year.” See 
N.Y. State, Div. Alcoholic Bev. Control, Licensing Information, 
available at http://abc.state.ny.us/JSP/content/licensing.jsp.   
21 Approximately 95% of the 1,078,920 convicted state felons 
in 2004 pled guilty.  See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook 
of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, available at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462004.pdf. In 2004, 
71,692 defendants pled guilty out of 83,391 federal defendants.  
Id.  
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit should be 
reversed. 
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